Documentation · v0.4.2

AMH Cloudflare Ops MCP
by WT

An approval-gated Cloudflare operations suite with an optional private Agent Harness: bounded delegation, deterministic verification, OAuth-isolated MCP tools, and verified deploy checks without handing agents raw account credentials.

An approval-gated Cloudflare operations suite with an optional private Agent Harness: bounded delegation, deterministic verification, OAuth-isolated MCP tools, and verified deploy checks without handing agents raw account credentials.

·Private Agent Harness: Jack-friendly reusable profiles plus eight automatic process skill folders for safe deploys, live checks, mail loopback, lean handoffs, security review, private MCP access, Google source research, and optional Claude second opinions.
·SafeTry controls: read-only defaults, explicit approvals, narrow adapters instead of a generic shell, tenant isolation, retention limits, and a tamper-evident audit chain.
·Verified deploy gate: checks the public target for an explicit 2xx status, rejects redirects, and optionally requires an expected release marker before reporting success.
·Deterministic site health: zero-AI HTTP checks remain useful for small valid pages and can require an expected text marker to catch a 200 response serving the wrong site.
·Self-catching email loopback: exercises the configured sending/routing path and records delivery evidence; it does not claim to prove placement in a provider's inbox tab.
·Cloudflare-native connections: optional OAuth connectors for the official Cloudflare API, Workers Builds, Bindings, Observability, and Docs MCP services, plus Wrangler-based Worker deployment and secrets.
·Guarded operations: Turnstile, DNS, SPF/DMARC/BIMI, Email Routing, Pages cutovers, cache purge, scoped tokens, and account diagnostics stay dry-run or approval-gated where they write.

Latest update - v0.4.2: the live harness now selects reusable skill folders automatically, shows them in the operator console, records them in hashed job packets, supports Google-first source research and an optional user-configured Claude verification pass, and targets learned improvements at reviewable skill revisions. See the latest release.

Cloudflare Ops MCP scans Cloudflare configuration, computes a diff of desired vs current DNS / Email Routing / BIMI / DMARC / SPF / Pages / cache / Turnstile setup, and applies fixes only after explicit approval. It is built for people who want an AI agent to help with Cloudflare safely: scan first, show the plan, then write only when the owner approves.

Version 0.4.2 works five ways
·CLI: run cfops locally with a scoped Cloudflare token.
·Library: import the zero-dependency engine into your own app.
·Hosted OAuth MCP: connect your own Cloudflare account and receive a one-user cfops_ connector key. The owner's API token is never shared.
·Self-hosted MCP Worker: deploy the included Worker with Wrangler for your own team or infrastructure.
·Private Agent Harness: deploy the companion agent/ Worker behind the MCP Worker's AGENT_HARNESS service binding for bounded jobs, health watches, schedules, audit, and the authenticated operator console.

For repository-connected deployments, see GIT-INTEGRATION.md. The recommended route uses Cloudflare Workers Builds' GitHub App authorization; the MCP does not store a GitHub token.

Cloudflare Ops MCP is especially useful for Cloudflare operators who need repeatable DNS hygiene across many zones: SPF cleanup, DMARC enforcement, BIMI records, MX checks, DKIM discovery, Cloudflare Email Routing, TXT verification records, safe DNS upserts, and audit logs for every approved write.

Unofficial Cloudflare tool. Cloudflare Ops MCP is made by AMH - Artificial Mind Hive, operated by Service Pricer LLC. It is independent, third-party, open-source software. It is not affiliated with, endorsed by, sponsored by, or made by Cloudflare, Inc. "Cloudflare" and "Wrangler" are referenced only to describe compatibility with Cloudflare's platform and official developer tooling. You are responsible for every DNS, Email Routing, DMARC, BIMI, SPF, or Worker change you approve and apply.

No owner's API key in Git or in your client. Public users authorize Cloudflare directly. OAuth access and refresh tokens stay server-side in KV; the connector key is stored only as a SHA-256 hash and is bound to one OAuth grant.

Cloudflare Ops MCP is focused on the Cloudflare tasks that regularly break launches, email trust, bot checks, cache freshness, brand display, and AI-agent workflows:

·DNS record scan, lookup, create, update, no-op detection, and guarded delete.
·SPF detection and planning so you do not accidentally create multiple SPF records.
·DMARC parsing and policy updates that only change the fields you asked for.
·BIMI TXT setup with a DMARC enforcement gate.
·DKIM discovery so the report can tell whether sender keys exist.
·MX and Cloudflare Email Routing checks.
·Email Routing destination/rule setup with verified-destination protection.
·Audit logs for applied changes.
·Cloudflare Pages DNS cutovers and cache purge operations.
·Turnstile widget planning/creation for bot checks.
·MCP endpoint deployment on Cloudflare Workers with Wrangler secrets.
·AI-agent safety defaults: dry-run first, diff display, no token in tool args, no accidental deletes.

This is not meant to replace every Cloudflare feature. It is the narrow, safe lane for common Cloudflare ops an operator or AI agent should be allowed to do.

The examples below are intentionally direct. They are not toy examples. They show the exact dry-run -> review -> apply pattern users should follow when fixing real domains.

Cloudflare Pages DNS cutover

Use this when an old registrar, parking page, Vercel app, HugeDomains page, or stale A/AAAA records are blocking a Cloudflare Pages custom domain.

Dry-run first:

cfops pages example.com --target project.pages.dev

Apply only after reviewing the delete/create plan:

cfops pages example.com --target project.pages.dev --apply
What it changes
·Deletes conflicting apex A/AAAA/CNAME records.
·Deletes conflicting www A/AAAA/CNAME records and www NS delegations.
·Adds proxied CNAME records for apex and www pointing at the Pages target.
·Leaves TXT, MX, SPF, DKIM, DMARC, BIMI, and other delegated subdomains alone.
·Leaves wildcard records alone unless you explicitly add --wildcard.
Options
·--no-www only cuts over the apex domain.
·--wildcard also removes conflicting *.example.com A/AAAA/CNAME records.

Wrangler is Cloudflare's official developer CLI. Cloudflare Ops MCP can run without Wrangler as a local CLI/library, but Wrangler is the right path when you want a remote MCP server because it deploys the Worker, stores secrets, tails logs, and manages Cloudflare bindings from the same toolchain Cloudflare documents.

Use Wrangler when you want
·a hosted MCP endpoint for agents and teammates;
·server-side OAuth client secrets and optional private admin fallback secrets;
·Cloudflare Pages/Workers deployment checks;
·observability through Cloudflare logs;
·a repeatable production setup instead of local-only scripts.

Use the plain CLI when you only need one local terminal to scan or fix a zone.

Agent-safe Cloudflare writes

Cloudflare Ops MCP keeps the write path narrow: scan the target, show the diff, wait for explicit approval, then apply only the requested DNS, DMARC, BIMI, SPF, Email Routing, Pages, cache, or Turnstile change.

Per-user OAuth isolation

Public users connect their own Cloudflare account and receive an opaque cfops_ connector key. Only its hash is stored. Each request resolves to exactly one OAuth grant, user-supplied tenant switching is ignored, refresh tokens remain server-side, and either side can revoke the connection.

Email trust diagnostics

The scanner reports SPF, DKIM discovery, DMARC policy, BIMI readiness, MX records, and Cloudflare Email Routing status so an agent or operator can see what is missing before touching production DNS.

Other highlights
·Zero-dependency core library for host apps and CLI use.
·Scoped Cloudflare token guidance instead of Global API Key usage.
·Audit logging for applied changes, with token redaction.
·Operator-ready setup docs for CLI, library, and self-hosted MCP use.
·Dry-run by default. Every mutating function takes an options object and only writes when { apply: true } is passed. The CLI is dry-run unless you add --apply. A dry-run returns the planned change plus a before/after diff and writes nothing.
·Scan before write. Apply paths re-fetch current state and return a before/after diff, so you always see exactly what will change.
·Never delete as a side effect. Deleting a DNS record requires an explicit deleteDnsRecord(..., { confirm: true }) call (CLI: --force). An apply never deletes anything.
·Token hygiene. The Cloudflare API token is read only from process.env.CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN. It is never logged, never written to the audit log, and never included in thrown error messages - any token-looking substring is redacted defensively.
·Scoped token only. Use a least-privilege scoped API token. Do not use the Global API Key.
·BIMI precondition. setupBimi first checks the domain's DMARC policy. If p is missing or none, it refuses to write in apply mode (BIMI is not honored below enforcement) unless you pass { force: true }. In dry-run it warns.
·Audit log. Every apply appends one JSON line to an audit log (default ./cloudflare-ops-mcp-audit.log) with { ts, action, domain, record, before, after } - never the token.

For the fastest path, start with SETUP.md. It explains the CLI path, the Wrangler-hosted MCP path, and how users provide their own Cloudflare credentials safely. See PHASES.md for the rollout model, OAUTH.md for hosted Cloudflare OAuth, and ROADMAP.md for the next upgrades.

·Visit Connect Cloudflare.
·Approve the Cloudflare permissions shown on the consent screen.
·Copy the one-time MCP configuration into Claude, Codex, Cursor, or another Streamable HTTP MCP client.
·Restart or reconnect the client. It calls MCP initialize and tools/list automatically—users do not need to memorize tool names.
·Ask for the outcome in plain language.
Example prompts
Scan example.com and explain the DNS and email-auth problems. Do not write anything.

Check DMARC, SPF, DKIM, BIMI, MX, and Cloudflare Email Routing.

Show me a dry-run to move example.com to project.pages.dev. Preserve email records.

Plan a cache purge for these three URLs. Do not apply it.

Apply exactly the change I just approved, then verify the live result.

The agent chooses the appropriate MCP tool from its schema. Read-only calls run immediately. Mutation tools return a dry-run diff unless the caller explicitly sends apply: true; users should approve only after reading that diff.

Current v0.4 tools cover DNS, email authentication/routing, Pages cutover, cache purge, Turnstile, token operations, and account diagnostics — plus the AMH WT Agent Harness (agent/): a private companion Worker for bounded research, verification, UI checks, and zero-AI site-health watches. Eight native process folders under skills/ are selected automatically and recorded in each job packet: safe deployment, live verification, email loopback, compact context handoff, refute-first security review, private MCP access, Google source research, and an optional user-configured Claude second opinion. One Durable Object per user keeps a tamper-evident audit chain, friendly reusable agent profiles (Jack is the default office manager), a Continuity Keeper briefing with automatic 4/7/30-day retention, daily model-call limits, schedules, and candidate skill/template revisions that never self-apply. The default Free profile uses @cf/zai-org/glm-4.7-flash with independent @cf/google/gemma-4-26b-a4b-it verification; @cf/moonshotai/kimi-k2.6 is labeled and enabled only as an explicit Workers Paid profile. The authenticated console and optional terminal show live handoffs, names, skills, limits, alerts, and exact recorded model calls without spending another inference. Official Cloudflare API, Workers Builds, Bindings, Observability, and Docs MCP connectors use each operator's own OAuth grant. See AGENT-HARNESS.md, CLOUDFLARE-MCP.md, MAIL-LANDING-GUIDE.md, and RELEASE-GATE.md.

Request: “Deploy my Worker, make sure the nav does not 404 on phone, and verify the confirmation email really comes back.”

·The coordinator attaches cfops-safe-deploy, cfops-live-verify, cfops-email-loopback, and cfops-context-handoff to the bounded work instead of creating permanent extra agents.
·SafeTry runs tests, a Wrangler dry-run, a Git checkpoint, and an exact public version-marker gate. A successful upload alone is not accepted.
·Live verification checks the changed route, redirect policy, expected text, and phone interaction. A 200 response serving the wrong app fails.
·Mail verification sends a one-use challenge through the production sender, public MX, Cloudflare Email Routing, and the inbound Worker. It records confirmed, expired, or failed without exposing the message credential.
·The handoff keeps the release commit, deployment receipt, verified facts, and next safe action; stale chatter expires. If the same correction recurs, the agent files a revision against the responsible skill for review and testing.

For current research, cfops-google-research opens and traces primary sources instead of trusting snippets. Hard claims may also use cfops-claude-verifier as an independent second opinion when the operator has configured that provider; the user's key is never included in the repository.

npm install cloudflare-ops-mcp
# or run the CLI without installing:
npx cloudflare-ops-mcp scan example.com

Requires Node.js >= 18 (for the built-in global fetch). No other dependencies.

·Cloudflare dashboard -> My Profile -> API Tokens -> Create Token.
·Choose Create Custom Token.
·Under Permissions, add exactly these three: Zone -> Zone -> Read; Zone -> DNS -> Edit; Zone -> Email Routing Rules -> Edit.
·Under Zone Resources, select Include -> Specific zone -> your domain (not "All zones").
·(Recommended) set a TTL and/or Client IP Address Filtering.
·Continue -> Create Token, then copy the token value once (it is shown only at creation; if lost, roll it).

Do not use the Global API Key - it has access to everything, cannot be scoped or time-limited, and there is only one per account.

Provide the token

Put it in your environment (never in a CLI argument or in code):

export CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN="your-scoped-token"

or copy .env.example to .env and fill it in:

cp .env.example .env
# then load it however you prefer (e.g. `set -a; . ./.env; set +a`)

cloudflare-ops-mcp reads CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN from the environment only.

For the public hosted service:

·Open https://cfops.nothingunseen.com/oauth/cloudflare/start.
·Approve only the Cloudflare scopes shown on Cloudflare's consent screen.
·Copy the one-time cfops_ connector key from the success page.
·Put that connector key in your MCP client's Authorization header.

The connector key is not a Cloudflare API token. Its SHA-256 hash maps to one server-side OAuth connection, so it cannot select another user's grant. Cloudflare access and refresh tokens never enter Git, chat, an issue, or the MCP tool arguments.

Claude Desktop or Cursor-style configuration
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "cloudflareOps": {
      "url": "https://cfops.nothingunseen.com/mcp",
      "headers": {
        "Authorization": "Bearer cfops_YOUR_CONNECTOR_KEY"
      }
    }
  }
}
Codex CLI
codex mcp add cloudflare-ops --url https://cfops.nothingunseen.com/mcp \
  --bearer-token-env-var CFOPS_CONNECTOR_KEY

Then set CFOPS_CONNECTOR_KEY in your own environment. Do not commit it. See OAUTH.md for status, revocation, refresh behavior, and self-hosting.

Cloudflare Ops MCP does not ship with an API key, shared account, hosted proxy token, or any hidden credentials. Every operator must bring one of these:

·a scoped Cloudflare API token in their own environment for local CLI/library use;
·a scoped Cloudflare API token stored as their own Worker secret for self-hosted MCP use;
·a per-user Cloudflare OAuth connection stored server-side by the Worker for hosted MCP use;
·an OAuth/token-vault integration built by their own host app, with approval gates before writes.

Do not ask users to send tokens through chat, issues, logs, or screenshots. If a token is exposed, rotate it in Cloudflare and create a new scoped token.

Wrangler consumes tokens. The official Cloudflare MCP consumes tokens. Nothing in the toolchain manufactures least-privilege tokens on demand — so everyone ends up doing agent work with one big long-lived key. This is the gap mint_scoped_token closes:

·You hold one bootstrap token (needs User > API Tokens > Edit). It stays a Worker secret or env var — it never travels through a chat or an agent transcript.
·An agent asks for a task token: mint_scoped_token { domain: "example.com", preset: "dns-zone", ttl_seconds: 3600 }. Dry-run first, like every mutating tool here — you see the exact policy JSON before anything is created.
·The minted token is confined to ONE zone, with preset permissions, and auto-expires (default 1 hour, hard-capped at 24 h unless confirm_long=true). Presets: zone-read, dns-zone, cache-purge. There is deliberately no super or account-wide preset — mint down, never up.
·Hand it to whatever does the work — a cheaper model, a cron job, even Wrangler itself (CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN=<minted> wrangler ...). When it leaks or lingers, it's a key to one zone's DNS that dies within the hour.
·list_tokens shows what's outstanding (never values), revoke_token kills one early.

This is the flow the vending machine is built for: a strong orchestrator model plans, a cheap model executes.

·The orchestrator (Claude, or your pick) decides what needs doing and calls mint_scoped_token for exactly that scope.
·A cheap tool-calling model (Kimi K2, Groq-hosted Llama, anything OpenAI-compatible) gets the minted token + the MCP endpoint and grinds the routine work — DNS fixes, DMARC rollouts, cache busts — through the same dry-run-gated tools.
·Every mutating call still requires apply: true, so the cheap agent's mistakes surface as diffs, not damage.

MCP is model-agnostic by design: any MCP client can point at the hosted Worker endpoint, and any tool-calling LLM can drive that client.

Read-only diagnostics for the failure modes that actually burn multi-account operators:

·who_serves_domain — domain → zone → Worker routes, Worker custom domains, and Pages projects that claim it, with a warning when several products fight over one hostname. Answers "what is ACTUALLY serving this URL?" without four dashboard tabs.
·account_doctor — which accounts this token can see, whether the account you meant is among them (wrong-token detection), and same-name Pages projects across accounts — the decoy that lets a deploy "succeed" into the wrong account while production never changes.
·pages_branch_check — the project's production branch vs the branch you're about to deploy. Catches the silent "git says master, project says main, every deploy lands on a preview" failure before it eats an afternoon.
cfops <command> <domain> [options]
CommandWhat it does
scan <domain>Full read-only snapshot: DNS, SPF, DKIM, DMARC, BIMI, Email Routing.
plan <domain> [--inbox x@y]Report desired vs current email-auth posture (no writes).
dns <domain> --type T --name N --content C [--ttl n] [--proxied] [--apply]Upsert a DNS record (create / update / no-op).
email <domain> --forward a@b=to@c [--catch-all to@c] [--apply]Plan/apply Email Routing forward rules + catch-all.
dmarc <domain> --policy quarantine [--rua mailto:x] [--pct 25] [--apply]Change only the DMARC p= (and rua/pct), safely.
bimi <domain> --logo <url> [--vmc <url>] [--apply] [--force]Set default._bimi TXT (refuses if DMARC=none unless --force).
verify <domain>Verify the API token, then resolve the zone.

Global flags: --apply (perform the write; default is dry-run), --force (BIMI DMARC override / delete), --audit <path> (audit log location), -h/--help.

Everything is a dry-run until you add --apply. BIMI needs a hosted SVG Tiny-PS logo URL that you supply via --logo (and, for Gmail/Apple Mail display, a VMC/CMC via --vmc).

Assume a scoped token is exported and each domain is a zone in your account.

(a) Add default._bimi TXT to example.com

First, dry-run (writes nothing - shows the diff):

cfops bimi example.com --logo https://example.com/bimi/logo.svg
BIMI for example.com (DMARC p=quarantine, enforcing=true):
  new record: v=BIMI1; l=https://example.com/bimi/logo.svg
  action: create (dry-run)
  record: TXT default._bimi.example.com
  - before: (record does not exist)
  + after:  content="v=BIMI1; l=https://example.com/bimi/logo.svg" ttl=1
  warn: No VMC/CMC supplied (a=). Gmail and Apple Mail require a VMC/CMC to display the logo; Yahoo/AOL do not.

Dry-run only. Re-run with --apply to write this change.

Then apply:

cfops bimi example.com --logo https://example.com/bimi/logo.svg --apply

If example.com's DMARC were still at p=none, the apply would be blocked with an error telling you to raise DMARC first (or pass --force). Fix DMARC, then set BIMI.

(b) Add default._bimi TXT to example.org

Dry-run:

cfops bimi example.org --logo https://example.org/bimi/logo.svg

Apply once the diff looks right:

cfops bimi example.org --logo https://example.org/bimi/logo.svg --apply

(For broad display in Gmail/Apple Mail, host a VMC/CMC and add --vmc https://example.org/bimi/vmc.pem.)

(c) Change _dmarc.example.org from p=none to p=quarantine

Dry-run first - note it changes only p, preserving your existing rua:

cfops dmarc example.org --policy quarantine --rua mailto:dmarc@example.org --pct 25
DMARC none -> quarantine for example.org:
  new record: v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.org; pct=25
  action: update (dry-run)
  record: TXT _dmarc.example.org
  - before: content="\"v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.org\"" ttl=1
  + after:  content="\"v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.org; pct=25\"" ttl=1
  changed fields: content

Dry-run only. Re-run with --apply to write this change.

Then apply:

cfops dmarc example.org --policy quarantine --rua mailto:dmarc@example.org --pct 25 --apply

Ramp safely. Only flip to quarantine after p=none + rua reports show all your legitimate mail is authenticating with alignment. Then widen --pct 25 -> 50 -> 100 over a couple of weeks before ever considering p=reject. pct is honored today but is being removed in the in-progress DMARCbis revision - treat it as current best practice, not forever.

cloudflare-ops-mcp exposes clean named exports so a host app can import and wrap it (add your own auth, approval UI, or multi-tenant token vault) - but it has no dependency on any host and runs perfectly standalone.

import {
  CloudflareClient,
  scanZone,
  applyDnsRecord,
  setDmarcPolicy,
  setupBimi,
  setupEmailRouting,
  planEmailAuth,
  appendAudit,
} from "cloudflare-ops-mcp";

const client = new CloudflareClient(); // reads CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN from env
// (you may also inject { token, fetch } - useful for tests)

// Read-only snapshot:
const snapshot = await scanZone(client, "example.com");

// Plan a DMARC flip (dry-run - writes nothing):
const plan = await setDmarcPolicy(client, "example.com", "quarantine", {
  rua: "mailto:dmarc@example.com",
  pct: 25,
});

// Apply it, then record the change yourself (you supply the timestamp):
const applied = await setDmarcPolicy(
  client,
  "example.com",
  "quarantine",
  { rua: "mailto:dmarc@example.com", pct: 25 },
  { apply: true }
);
appendAudit("./cloudflare-ops-mcp-audit.log", {
  ts: new Date().toISOString(),
  action: "dmarc.policy",
  domain: "example.com",
  record: applied.record,
  before: applied.before,
  after: applied.after,
});

Every mutating export is dry-run unless you pass { apply: true }, and pure logic never calls Date.now() - you (or the CLI) supply audit timestamps.

Public exports
·CloudflareClient, CloudflareError, redactToken
·resolveZoneId, resolveZone, scanZone
·listRecords, findRecord, applyDnsRecord, deleteDnsRecord
·getRoutingStatus, enableRouting, listDestinations, addDestination, listRules, getCatchAll, setupEmailRouting
·parseDmarc, buildDmarc, parseSpf, getDmarc, setDmarcPolicy, quoteTxt, unquoteTxt
·parseBimi, buildBimi, validateBimiSvgUrl, setupBimi
·planEmailAuth
·appendAudit, AUDIT_DEFAULT_PATH
Embedding in a platform

cloudflare-ops-mcp is a generic, open tool. A larger platform can import it to automate zone hygiene for its users (wrapping it with per-account tokens and an approval step), but it is completely standalone - the library and CLI run on their own with nothing but a scoped Cloudflare token.

worker/ is an optional Model Context Protocol server (a Cloudflare Worker) that exposes the same engine as tools over a URL, so any MCP client - an agent, Claude, Cursor - can scan_zone, plan_email_auth, set_dmarc_policy, setup_bimi, etc. by pointing at it.

Four deliberate hardening choices
·Every public user has an isolated OAuth connection. The browser callback generates a random connector ID and a random cfops_ key. Only the key hash is stored.
·The Cloudflare token is server-side, never a tool parameter. It does not travel through MCP tool arguments, Git history, or an agent transcript.
·Authorization fails closed. Unknown, missing, revoked, or cross-user connector keys receive 401. Only the private owner admin key can use the optional fallback token.
·Every mutating tool is dry-run by default. The caller must pass apply: true after seeing the diff. BIMI keeps its DMARC precondition.
cd worker
npx wrangler secret put CLOUDFLARE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID
npx wrangler secret put CLOUDFLARE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET
npx wrangler secret put CLOUDFLARE_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI
npx wrangler deploy

Users visit /oauth/cloudflare/start, complete Cloudflare consent, and copy the one-time connector configuration. The MCP endpoint is /mcp. Private self-hosters may additionally set MCP_ACCESS_KEY and CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN as an owner-only fallback; never distribute that admin key.

The core library has zero dependencies; the Worker is an optional surface - you never need it to use the CLI.

Development
npm test        # node --test (mock fetch, no live network calls)

WT is AMH's current operator-safety effort: a guarded agent middle layer connecting Cloudflare Agents, MCP, and Wrangler. The goal is to let capable orchestrators and correctly labeled free or paid tool-calling agents inspect, plan, request approval, deploy, verify, and recover—without handing them raw Cloudflare tokens or letting stale agents overwrite newer work.

Watch for the stateful AMH Agent Coordinator, Cache Guardian, Change Guardian, Playwright phone/UI checks, and allowlisted Wrangler doctor, deployment, log, rollback, binding, and storage-health tools. The execution rule stays the same: check → diff → approve → apply → verify.

     /\        |\    /|      |    |
    /--\       | \  / |      |----|
   /    \      |  \/  |      |    |

             A M H  //  W T

-/\-\ M H // WT · YOUR CLOUDFLARE STAYS YOURS

Made by -/-\ M H // WT — AMH, Artificial Mind Hive, operated by Service Pricer LLC.

·Service Pricer: servicepricer.app
·AMH on GitHub: @pain2hustle
·Artificial Mind Hive: amhsiterevival.com
·Public AMH-built work: Nothing Unseen
·Project policies: Privacy · Terms · Security · MIT License

License: MIT (c) 2026 Pain2HuStle

About

AMH WT Cloudflare Ops MCP: per-user OAuth tools plus a private SafeTry Agent Harness with automatic process skills, Google source research, optional Claude verification, live/404 and email loopback checks, Wrangler deploy gates, audit, and no shared owner API keys.

cfops.nothingunseen.com